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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
State appeals from District Judge John R. Stegner' s Judgment 
Respondent John Marr's conviction for felony domestic battery. Mr. Marr concurs with 
Judge Stegner's findings and conclusions, which are well-supported in the record, and 
requests that this Court affirm. 
Statement of Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
1. The Incident and Charges 
On September 26, 2011, John Marr and his new wife, Marci Myva Jones, had a 
dispute in a small apartment that they shared in Coeur d'Alene. There were no 
witnesses to this event besides Mr. Marr and Ms. Jones, and the proceedings that would 
follow turned on their respective versions of what happened. 
It was Mr. Marr, not Ms. Jones, who called the police, and they responded to the 
apartment at about 2:00 a.m. (State v. Marr, Appellate Docket No. 39918, Clerk's Record 
on Appeal, p. 10.) They noticed that Ms. Jones had bruises on her neck, chest, and arms, 
and that she had bloodshot eyes. (Id. at 11.) Mr. Marr had a bite mark on his left arm 
that was bleeding, a red mark on his left cheek, and a scratch on his right forearm. (Id. 
at 12.) 
Officers took statements from both. (Docket No. 39918, Clerk's Rec., p. 12.) Ms. 
Jones told officers that she had "been drinking all day." (Id. at 10.) She further said that 
1 
an 
to 
passed out. (Id.) She said that Mr. Marr also showed her a closed fist .... u~.,~ .... 
if she "wanted one of these," and then punched her in the face. (Id. at 10.) She 
claimed that she had bit Mr. Marr1 s arm to get him to release his hold on her. (Id. at 11.) 
She also provided a nearly unintelligible written statement for the officers. (Id. at 15-16.) 
Mr. Marr had a different version. He told the officers that he was trying to go to 
sleep, but a drunken Ms. Jones continued to play loud music on the radio. (Docket No. 
39918, Clerk's Rec., p. 11.) Mr. Marr confirmed that Ms. Jones had been drinking 
heavily, which was not unusual for her. (Id.) When Mr. Marr asked her to turn the 
volume down, she suddenly flew into a rage, became violent, and tried to punch him. 
(Id.) He restrained her - the officer wrote that at one point Mr. Marr said he was on top 
of her holding her down in a "modified choke hold" - and she bit him on the arm, 
breaking the skin. (Id.) When asked how Ms. Jones's injuries occurred, he claimed that 
they likely happened as he was trying to protect himself. (Id.) This was not the first 
time, according to Mr. Marr, that Ms. Jones had hit him. (Id.) 
Mr. Marr was arrested and charged with felony attempted strangulation and 
domestic battery with a traumatic injury. (Docket No. 39918, Clerk's Rec., pp. 20-21.) 
The Court appointed the Kootenai County Public Defender as his counsel. (Id. at p. 28.) 
2 
the Ms. Jones's version of 
to 
she testified that Mr. Marr choked her "three to five times" she 
passed out each time. (Docket No. 39918, PH Tr., p. 5: In. 22-23.) Also, she claimed that 
these choking-out incidents took place off-and-on over the course of "a couple of 
"(Id.) And she no longer remembered whether Mr. Marr asked her if "she 
wanted one of these" or punched her with a closed fist. (PH, p. 25: 14-19.) 
Mr. Marr was bound over for trial on the two felony counts. (PH Tr., p. 27: 10-
11.) Deputy Public Defender Sarah L. Sears represented Marr after the preliminary 
hearing. (Clerk's Rec., p. 34.) 
2. Ms. Sears's Pretrial Investigation 
When Nls. Sears was assigned Mr. Marr' s case, she had been out of law school for 
about six years. (Evidentiary Hearing Transcript ("EH Tr."), pp. 6: 17-21; 8: 12-13.) She 
was responsible for felonies, misdemeanors, involuntary mental commitments, and 
drug court. (Id. at 8: 15-25; 9: 1-15.) Her caseload averaged about 150 to 200 open cases 
- maybe even more which she has characterized as "really heavy." (Id.) 
Mr. Marr was in custody for the entire time that his case was pending. (EH Tr., 
p. 78: 15-20.) According to him, Ms. Sears met with him at the jail only once, though he 
was able to speak with her on the phone on a few other occasions, and he wrote letters 
to her. (EH Tr., pp. 79: 19-23; 80: 6-8; 82: 8-10.) One of the Public Defender's 
3 
was also assigned the case. at 51: 
one or 
atpp. : 1-2.) 
Although Mr. Durant and to a lesser extent Ms. Sears testified at the post-
conviction evidentiary hearing that Mr. Marr told them different details about the 
incident with Ms. Jones over time, Mr. Marr was consistent on two main themes: Ms. 
Jones was intoxicated and she was the instigator. (EH Tr., pp. 15: 20-25; 16: 1-2; 40: 4-22; 
65: 4-21; 88: 7-10.) Mr. Marr also told both Ms. Sears and Mr. Durant, verbally and in 
writing, that Marci Jones had a serious problem with alcohol, that she would become 
aggressive when intoxicated, and that others in the community would support those 
allegations. (EH Tr., pp. 15: 20-24; 16: 1-2; 64: 1-5; Petitioner's Evidentiary Hearing Ex. 
A.) Based on his own knowledge, Mr. Durant agreed that Ms. Jones had a background 
of intoxication with "violence peppered in there." (EH Tr., p. 56: 11-20.) He believed 
that she was a "nasty drunk." (Id.) 
An independent law enforcement officer who had interacted with Ms. Jones held 
a similar opinion, though he was not contacted by the defense. Idaho State Police patrol 
officer Donald Moore testified at the evidentiary hearing that he recalled Marci Jones 
when he was member of the Bonners Ferry Police Department in 2004 and 2005. 
Bonners Ferry is a small enough community that Officer Moore became familiar with its 
through his work as a patrolman. (EH Tr., pp. 67: 22-25.) His opinion was 
4 
was 
was 
she was sober. at 69: Officer Moore had also discussed 
Jones's behavior with others who had interacted with her in the community, and 
when asked whether she had a reputation {/for beiligerence, for aggressiveness after 
<linking to excess," he responded that, "she was known to be difficult, yes." (Id. at 76: 1-
While Ms. Sears was generally aware that Ms. Jones's criminal record contained 
"misdemeanors related to drinking," she did not look into the circumstances of those 
cases to determine whether they were factually similar to the present case. (EH Tr., p. 
21: 2-8, 20-25.) The records containing the facts about Ms. Jones's rather extensive 
misdemeanor criminal history, which included her own previous domestic violence 
charges and convictions, could have been easily found in court records. (Exhibit B to 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Clerk's Record, pp. 27-58.) 
Ms. Sears admitted at the evidentiary hearing that she did not investigate 
whether any witnesses, such as Officer Moore, could offer an opinion at trial that Ms. 
Jones had a character trait for becoming an aggressor while intoxicated. (EH Tr., pp. 19: 
7-25; 20: 1-25; 22: 1-20.) Nor did she determine whether any additional witnesses might 
be available testify that Ms. Jones had such a reputation in the community. (Id.) Ms. 
Sears conceded that "it was pretty obvious that [Marci Jones J did have that ff 
5 
at When asked at the evidentiary hearing about 
The Tury Trial 
At trial, Ms. Jones testified again that Mr. Marr would not let her leave the 
apartment and that she was standing by the sink when he suddenly choked her into 
unconsciousness. (Docket No. 39918, Jury Trial Transcript ("JT Tr.")., pp. 65-68, 79-80.) 
She claimed that Mr. Marr did this "two or three times" and that she eventually bit his 
arm. (JT Tr., pp. 83: 5-8; 84: 4-5.) She admitted that she had a habit of drinking about six 
beers a day for "the last couple of years," and that she had that much to drink on the 
day of the argument. (JT Tr., p. 86: 5-9.) Notably, despite telling police officers that Mr. 
Marr said "do you want one of these" before punching her in the face, she claimed at 
trial that Mr. Marr did not punch her. (JT Tr., pp. 117: 11-19, 134: 2-4.) 
In addition, although it was on Ms. Sears's "radar" that Ms. Jones may have been 
drinking before she testified, Ms. Sears wholly failed to explore that fruitful area. (EH 
Tr., pp. 24: 15-18.) Ms. Jones was mumbling her words, and Mr. Marr told her that Ms. 
Jones was intoxicated. (EH Tr., pp. 24: 15-25; 25: 1-18.) Despite acknowledging that a 
witness's intoxication is relevant to her credibility and her ability to recall past events, 
Ms. Sears did not follow-up at all. (JT Tr., pp. 118: 9-22.) 
1 Mr. Marr disagrees with the State's present interpretation in its Brief of what Ms. Sears meant when she 
testified that she "missed" the issue (Brief of Appellant, pp. 13-14), which he will address in the argument 
section. 
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was on 
Ms. Jones very angry. (JT Tr.1 pp. 194: 24-25; 195: 1-21.) She then 
"vicious and violent," strode across the room, and punched him in the side of the face. 
(Id.) He caught her hand and they fell on the bed. (Id.) They struggled there she was 
"fighting like a crazy person" - when she bit him hard on his arm. (JT Tr., pp. 194-96, 
210-11.) She then went into the bathroom and closed the door. (JT, pp. 196: 23-25.) Mr. 
Marr eventually opened the door, carried Ms. Jones out, and called the police. (JT Tr, p. 
197: 14-22.) 
Presiding Judge Charles W. Hosak instructed the jury, among other matters, to 
consider self-defense as a potential defense to the charges. (JT Tr., p. 220: 4-25.) The 
jury returned a verdict of not guilty of attempted strangulation but guilty of domestic 
battery with a traumatic injury. (Docket No. 39918, Clerk Rec., p. 121.) 
Kootenai County District Judge John T. Mitchell conducted the sentencing 
hearing. When Judge Mitchell asked if there were any errors in the presentence 
investigation report, Mr. Marr responded with wide-ranging comments about the PSI, 
his history, and the facts of the case, spanning over nearly 30 pages of transcript 
without interruption from Ms. Sears. (Docket No. 39918, Sent. Tr., pp. 3-30.) Ms. Sears's 
argument on Mr. Marr's behalf extends only a little over a page of the transcript, and 
she made no specific recommendation to the Court other than to note that 
7 
to fl was 
8 years (Id. at 45: 20-25.) 
Mr. Marr' s appeal was unsuccessful, and he filed a Petition for Post-Conviction 
, .. _ .. ~,. daiming that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial (Claim I) 
and at the sentencing hearing (Claim II). (Clerk's Record, pp. 6-13.) The case was 
reassigned to Judge Stegner in the Second Judicial District. Judge Stegner denied the 
State's Motion for Summary Dismissal and held an evidentiary hearing. He later issued 
a memorandum opinion concluding that Mr. Marr had established his claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial (Claim I). (Clerk's Record, pp. 101-30.) The State 
now appeals. 
2 The State notes that Judge Mitchell called Mr. Marr "delusional" before sentencing him. Of course, Judge 
Mitchell was not the trial judge and was not present when Ms. Jones testified so that he could weigh her 
demeanor or credibility. 
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ISSUE AND ARGUMENT 
did not err in concluding that Mr. Marr's was 
failing to present admissible evidence Ms. Jones's character trait for 
belligerence and aggression in a close case of self-defense and in failing to cross-
py;:,irn1·n° Mc Jnnec wr"ha .... c"he a ........ e~-ed '-~ t...~ d-·nt. -L L-!al 
_ .... ,-...ll._..L ._"- .L't'..&.1..7• vi. o .1.u .... .1.1. c,.1.1, pp a.1. 1.U UC .lU l.A dl l11 1. 
1. Introduction 
This was a close case in which the jury acquitted John Marr of attempted 
strangulation but convicted him of felony domestic battery. The jury had no knowledge 
that Ms. Jones had a trait of hostile behavior while intoxicated, which would have 
supported Mr. Marr's claim that he was repelling an attack from her. Contrary to the 
State's claims, trial counsel's failure to investigate and develop that evidence was based 
on her ignorance of the law and lack of diligence, and it was objectively unreasonable. 
Had she conducted a reasonable investigation, she would have uncovered Trooper 
Moore's testimony, which would have been admissible at trial. Had that evidence been 
presented, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different. 
2. Standard of Review 
In a post-conviction matter, this Court defers to the District Court's findings of 
fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Roberts v. State, 132 Idaho 494, 495-96, 975 P.3d 
782, 783-84 (1999). This Court then exercises free review over the District Court's 
application of law to those facts. (Id.) 
9 
to 
to States Constitution, applicable to the states through 
Amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). He also had a 
concomitant right under Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution. lvlurray v. State, 156 
Idaho 159,164,321 P.3d 709, 714 (2014). 
The test for determining whether the defendant has been deprived of that 
constitutional right is two-fold: first, he must show that his counsel committed errors 
that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and, second, he must 
demonstrate that he suffered actual prejudice as a result of those errors. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984); accord Johnson v. State, 156 Idaho 7, 10-11, 319 
P.3d 491, 494-95 (2014). Prejudice in this context means that, but for counsel's errors, 
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different. Strickland, 
466 U.S at 694. A reasonable probability is one that is "sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome." Id. 
10 
correctly determined that Mr. Marr had satisfied the first part 
of the Strickland test when he established that his trial counsel's representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness. This conclusion has a solid basis in the 
factual record. 
Initially, when this case was assigned to Attorney Sears, the facts set up a clear 
to investigate a possible claim of self-defense and to develop any evidence that 
may support that defense. This is so because Ms. Sears knew, or reasonably should have 
known, two critical things from the police reports and the preliminary hearing: (1) 
Marci Jones had documented injuries that would need to be explained, and (2) John 
Marr had already made a statement in which he admitted engaging in physical contact 
with Ms. Jones but claimed that he was restraining her and defending himself. 
This need became even more acute after trial counsel discussed the case with her 
client. She freely admitted at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing that Mr. Marr told 
her "all of the time" that Ms. Jones had a problem with aggressive conduct while she 
was under the influence of alcohol. (EH Tr., pp. 15: 20-24; 16: 1-2.) He informed her that 
others in the community could prove that trait. (EH Tr., Exhibit A.) Though his 
comments to her about the dispute with Ms. Jones varied in some respects during the 
case, trial counsel has testified that he "never wavered in his innocence." (EH 40: 
11 
more, 
to 
u ....... ~L was also aware of Ms. Jones's character and background. 
The Idaho Rules of Evidence have long permitted a defendant who claims self-
to introduce evidence that would tend to show that an alleged victim was the 
initial aggressor. The most obvious example is evidence establishing a character trait for 
aggressive or violent conduct. State v. Hernandez, 133 Idaho 576, 584, 990 P.2d 742, 750 
(Ct. App. 1999). Specifically, while Rule 404(a) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence generally 
excludes character evidence, an exception is available for "[ e ]vidence of a pertinent trait 
of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused." I.R.E. 404(a)(2). This 
exception exists because an alleged victim's character trait for violent and aggressive 
behavior makes a fact in dispute - whether the victim was the initial aggressor - more 
likely. Hernandez, 133 Idaho at 584, 990 P.2d at 750; State v. Custodio, 136 Idaho 197, 30 
975 (Ct. App. 2001). Character evidence of this sort may be proven by opinion and 
reputation testimony. I.R.E. 405(a). 
Here, counsel has conceded that she did not conduct any investigation to 
determine whether evidence could be developed to show that Ms. Jones was the initial 
aggressor in this case. (EH Tr., p. 21: 2-8.) Had she done so, she could have easily found 
and interviewed Trooper Moore, for instance, who is listed as the arresting and 
12 
County cases on 
State characterizes Ms. Sears's candid admission that she 
missed" this issue as relating only to the review of a certain police report. (Brief of 
Appellant pp. 13-14.) This Court should not be persuaded. The District Court found, as 
a factual matter, that Ms. Sears overlooked the larger issue of an investigation into 
potential witnesses who could testify about Ms. Jones' s character trait for belligerent 
and hostile conduct while drunk, and that she did not make a tactical or strategic 
decision when she did so. (Clerk's Record, p. 117.) That finding is amply supported by 
the record and is not clearly erroneous. 
The colloquy that led her to admit that she "just missed that" began with her 
admission that she did not recall investigating the factual basis underlying Ms. Jones' s 
previous convictions. (EH Tr., p. 21: 2-8, 20-25.) It is true that, as an example, she cited a 
police report attached to the post-conviction petition that contained facts in a different 
case that were strikingly similar to what Mr. Marr reported had happened in this case. 
(EH Tr., p. 21: 5-25.) Referring to that report, she remarked that she may have been able 
to use the factual information in her cross-examination of Ms. Jones. (Id.) But her answer 
was non-responsive to the original question, which asked her about the rules governing 
opinion and reputation evidence in self-defense cases, and it reveals that she simply did 
not know those rules. (EH, Tr., pp. 22:21-25; 23:1; 23:8-22.) Her ignorance on this point is 
13 
testimony can someone 
an can someone if 
necessarily helpful to us." (EH p. 43: 4-11.) In other words, she 
misunderstood that it was not Ms. Jones' s status as an alcoholic that was relevant; it was 
a trait for unpredictable aggressive conduct while using alcohol - a "nasty drunk" - would 
relevant. 
In any event, the State's argument is a red herring. Even if trial counsel was 
referring to her failure to use a single police report, the remainder of her testimony 
nonetheless establishes that she did not conduct any investigation into the larger issue. 
As found by the District Court, the record shows that despite Ms. Sears's basic 
awareness that Ms. Jones had an extensive misdemeanor criminal history peppered 
with a serious drinking problem, "she did not interview a single person about Jones's 
character or reputation for being belligerent while intoxicated." (Clerk's Record, p. 117; 
citing EH Tr., pp. 19: 7-25; 20: 1-25; 22: 1-20.) Counsel testified that she did not make a 
tactical or strategic decision, (EH, Tr., p. 43: 23-25; 44: 1-6), but if she did make some 
type of "decision," it was based on ignorance of the relevant law. (EH Tr., p. 43: 4-11.) 
This Court can safely affirm the District Court's finding on this point. 
The State further contends that trial counsel could not be ineffective because 
Trooper Moore's testimony would not have been admissible. (Brief of Appellant, pp. 7-
9.) The District Court found otherwise, and this Court should likewise. 
14 
narrows the scope this and to 
=n,~~,-= Moore to 
Moore testified that he had an independent recollection of 
Jones' s behavior even several years after his interactions with her. He noted that she 
was a docile and compiiant person while sober but that in his opinion she was "very 
belligerent" and "physically resistant" after drinking. (EH Tr., p. 69: 6-25; 70: 1-4.) 
While it is true he did not immediately agree with a description of her belligerent 
response to his orders as "aggressive" (Id. at 69: 12-15), when later asked whether she 
had a reputation in the community "for belligerence, for aggressiveness after she had 
drinking to excess," he responded "she was known to be very difficult, yes." (EH 
p. 76: 1-7.)(Emphasis added.) 
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that 
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence." I.R.E. 401. All relevant evidence is generally 
admissible unless otherwise prohibited by the Rules of Evidence. I.R.E. 402. 
The State contends that Trooper Moore's opinion that Ms. Jones was "very 
belligerent" and "physically resistant," and his agreement that she a reputation for 
"belligerence, for aggressiveness after drinking to excess," did not show a character trait 
that was relevant to first aggressor status or self-defense in this case. This argument 
should not be credited. Trooper Moore had seen Ms. Jones both drunk and sober, 
15 
was day. "Belligerent" and 
not or IS 
among other things, as, ti of warlike character; aggressively hostile; '-''-'H'"''"'"'-
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/belligerent (last accessed November 29, 2016). The 
gist of Trooper 1v1oore' s opinion was that Ms. Jones was hostile and combative while 
drunk. It is not stretch to find that a hostile or combative person with a police officer 
while drunk is also more likely to engage in sudden and unpredictable aggressive or 
violent behavior while drunk. 
It follows that Trooper Moore's testimony about Ms. Jones's conduct and 
character had a tendency to make facts of consequence in this matter - whether she 
attacked Mr. Marr while she was drunk and whether he used self-defense to repel such 
an attack- more probable than without that evidence. The evidence was relevant and 
admissible. For the reasons that follow, there is at least a reasonable probability that the 
evidence was weighty enough to tip the scales toward a full acquittal. 
5. Given Ms. Tones' s serious credibility problems, trial counsel's errors 
prejudiced Mr. Marr' s right to a fair trial 
This was not an overwhelming case of guilt in which no additional evidence 
would have made a difference. Marci Jones had serious credibility problems. She 
changed her story from her initial police statement to the preliminary hearing to the 
trial. Initially, she mentioned only one choking incident and claimed that Mr. Marr 
punched her the face after asking her whether she "wanted one of these." Later, the 
16 
to to over course 
was statements 
were vague and shifting. 
There is no doubt that Ms. Jones had documented injuries. The State makes much 
Ms. Jones's eye hemorrhaging and provides full-page color photographs attached to 
brief for this Court's review. Rather than support the notion that these injuries 
somehow mean that there could be no prejudice to Mr. Marr from his counsel's errors, 
they instead support the opposite conclusion. The prosecution's theory at trial rested 
heavily on the alleged strangulation aspect of this event. The State's case was based 
on Ms. Jones' s incredible claims of being choked out multiple times over a 
lengthy period, and it offered medical testimony that eye hemorrhaging can be 
attributable to choking. But the jury apparently disbelieved those claims, because Mr. 
Marr was acquitted of attempted strangulation. This is true despite the photographs of 
Ms. Jones' s serious eye hemorrhaging that the State provides. 
Mr. Marr' s guilt or innocence on the domestic battery charge hung in the 
balance. The defense offered no context to support his testimony that Ms. Jones 
unpredictably and violently attacked him, and that her injuries, even eye injuries, may 
have been the result of a reasonable use of force in response. A witness who could 
testify that Ms. Jones had that kind of character would have provided the necessary 
17 
no to 
case does not or fall solely on the character trait evidence, 
overlooks the District Court's additional basis for relief. The District Court further 
determined that trial counsel was also ineffective in failing to cross-examine Ms. Jones 
about whether she was intoxicated the day that she testified against Mr. Marr. (Clerk's 
Record, pp. 121-23.) Mr. Marr repeatedly told his trial counsel that Ms. Jones had a 
serious drinking problem. Ms. Jones "mumbled" her words while testifying, and Mr. 
Marr told his counsel that she was drunk. Despite acknowledging that a witness's 
intoxication is relevant and may affect her ability to recall events accurately, trial 
counsel failed to follow up after a single question about the last time that Ms. Jones had 
had anything to drink. The jury should have been made aware of the high likelihood 
that she was then under the influence, which would have eroded her already shaky 
credibility. 
The lower court did not have confidence in the fairness and outcome of this case. 
It concluded that, but for counsel's errors, there was a reasonable probability of a 
different result. That was a reasonable conclusion that should not be disturbed. 
18 
CONCLUSION 
that 
are not dearly erroneous, and affirm its legal conclusion 
was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. 
Respectfuliy submitted on this 30th day of November, 2016. 
Attorney for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
on 
of November, 2016, by depositing copies in the United States Mail, postage 
and addressed to: 
KENNETH K. JORGENSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0100 
JOHNJ.MARR 
#103124 
PO Box 14 
Boise ID 83707 
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